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The Commission appealed and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari on the issue of whether government-induced. temporary flooding
could ever give rise to a compensable takings claim.
Arguihg that temporary flooding was an exception to the general rule, the
United States' position was that, in order to create liability under the takings
clause, government-induced flooding needed to be permanent. The Court
disagreed. It rejected the United States' interpretation of earlier precedent,
explaining the temporary flooding exception was erroneously parsed out from
stand-alone sentences in prior precedent. Furthermore, the Court added that
subsequent developments in jurisprudence superseded the cases the United
States used to support its position.
The United States also argued that reversing the appeals court would disrupt public works in flood-control areas by making even the smallest flood
qualify as a compensable taking. The Court rejected this position as a slippery
slope argument, noting that this case was no different from other takings clause
cases that unsuccessfully urged blanket exceptions from the Fifth Amendment
without proper justification.
Finally, the United States asked the Court to address two additional issues:
(i) the collateral nature of the flood damage; and (ii) the bearing of Arkansas
water-right law on this case. The Court refused to express any opinion with
regard to these issues because the parties did not brief the issues or argue them
in the lower courts.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the appeals court's decision and held that
government-induced temporary flooding can give rise to a compensable taking
claim under the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted the majority of such
claims depend on situation-specific, factual inquiries. Consequently, the Court
remanded the case, directing the claims court to consider the duration of
compensable taking, owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations regarding the land's use, and the degree of foreseeability related to the invasion.
Natasha Schissler

Los Angeles Cnty. Flood Control Dist v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
133 S. Ct. 710 (2013) (holding the flow of water from an improved portion of
a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway is not
considered a discharge of a pollutant under the Clean Water Act).
The Los Angeles County Flood Control District ("District") operates a
drainage system that collects, transports, and discharges storm water. Federal
regulations define "storm water" as storm water runoff, snowinelt runoff, and.
surface runoff and drainage. Due to the highly polluted nature of the storm
water at issue in this case, the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required the drainage systems' operators to obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit before discharging the storm water into navigable
waters. The District obtained a NPDES permit in 1990 and subsequently renewed its permit several times.
The Natural Resources Defense Council and Santa Monica Baykeeper
("Respondents"), both of which are environmental organizations, filed a citizen
suit in United States District Court for the Central District of California ("district court"), alleging the District violated water quality measurement require-

Issue 2

COURTREPORTS

487

ments under its NPDES permit. Acknowledging water in the storm sewer system showed levels of pollutant discharges exceeding statutory limits, the district
court nevertheless granted summary judgment in favor of the District. Specifically, because the district court found many other entities had also discharged
into the water system, jointly contributing to the levels of pollution, the district
court ruled the record was insufficient to hold the District solely liable for the
pollution.
Respondents appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit ("Court of Appeals"), which reversed the district court in part,
holding a "discharge of pollutants" within the meaning of the CWA occurred
when polluted water left the District's concrete channel system and entered
downstream waterways without concrete linings. Because the District controlled the concrete portions of the system, the Court of Appeals held it was
responsible for discharges leaving its system into those watercourses unprotected by concrete lining.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider just one
issue: whether, under the CWA, does the flow of storm water out of a concrete channel within a river qualify as the "discharge of a pollutant?" Answering that question the negative, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. The
Court relied on legal precedent that held pumping polluted water from one
part of a water body into another part of the same body is not considered a
discharge of pollutants under the CWA.
The language of CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as the addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. The Court pointed
to the generally accepted meaning of the word "add" and explained that pollutants are not "added" when water is merely transferred between different portions of that water body. If such an addition were to be considered a discharge,
the Court explained, the water would have to be transferred between two
meaningfully distinct water bodies.
Ultimately, the Court held the flow of water from an improved portion of
a navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the same waterway does
not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA. Therefore, the Court
reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings.
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San Luis Unit Food Producers v. United States, 709 F.3d 798 (9th Cir.
2013) (holding the Reclamation Act, Central Valley Project Act, and San Luis
Act, did not impose a duty on the Bureau of Reclamation to provide farmers
with their preferred amount of water from the Central Valley Project).
In 1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act ("Act"), which provided
for the construction and operation of water collection, storage, and distribution
projects in several of the Western States, in an effort to reclaim arid lands and
support agriculture. The nation's largest reclamation project, the Central Valley Project ("CVP"), managed by the United States Bureau of Reclamation
("Bureau"), provides water to California's Central Valley.

